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THE FEDERALISM-RIGHTS NEXUS: 
EXPLAINING WHY SENATE DEMOCRATS 
CAN TOLERATE REHNQUIST COURT 
DECISION MAKING BUT NOT THE 
REHNQUIST COURT 
NEAL DEVINS* 
INTRODUCTION 
This essay attempts to explain the apparent disjunction 
between Congress's disinterest in Rehnquist Court decisions 
limiting federal power and recent calls by Senate Democrats to 
use the judicial confirmation process as a way of checking the 
Court for its "conservative judicial activism."1 Specifically, in 
light of recent attacks on the Rehnquist Court, why is it that 
Congress does not seem at all upset that the Rehnquist Court 
has struck down twenty-nine statutes, including several high-
profile measures, over the past seven years?2 Lawmakers from 
Goodrich Professor of Law and Professor of Government, College of 
William and Mary. This essay builds upon remarks made at Conservative 
Judicial Activism, a conference sponsored by the Byron R. White Center for the 
Study of American Constitutional Law and The University of Colorado Law 
Review, October 19-20, 2001. Thanks to Bob Nagel both for inviting me to the 
Conference and for helping me think about the Supreme Court's role in shaping 
constitutional discourse. Thanks also to conference participants for useful 
feedback. Thanks, finally, to Mike Gerhardt, Lee Rawls and Keith Whittington 
for useful conversations about this paper; to reference librarian extraordinaire, 
Fred Dingledy; to my research assistants Erin O'Callaghan and Robin Mittler; 
and to my William and Mary colleagues for comments at a works-in-progress 
colloquium. 
1. This essay will not provide a detailed examination of whether Senate 
Democrats are correct in accusing the Rehnquist Court of being "conservative" 
and "activist." My concern, instead, is the political saliency of Senate Democrats 
using the "conservative judicial activism" label to limit President Bush's power to 
make judicial appointments. 
2. From April 1995 to June 2000, the Court declared unconstitutional 
twenty-three federal statutes. Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Tipping Point, 32 NAT'L J. 
1810, 1811 (2000). In its 2001 and 2002 terms, the Court invalidated all or part of 
six federal statutes-four in 2001 and two in 2002. Linda Greenhouse, In Year of 
Florida Vote, Supreme Court Also Did Much Other Work, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 
2001, at A12; Linda Greenhouse, Court Had Rehnquist Initials Intricately Carved 
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both parties have largely ignored these decisions. And when 
lawmakers have responded to the Court, they treat the Court's 
decisions as final and dispositive-focusing, instead, on ways to 
enact corrective legislation consistent with the Court's ruling. 
At no point was there any suggestion of limiting the Court's 
jurisdiction or engaging in other activities associated with 
Court-curbing. Considering this backdrop, why are Democrats 
on the Senate Judiciary Committee now leading the charge 
against "conservative judicial activism"?3 
In sorting out this puzzle, I will consider two competing 
hypotheses-one fairly simple and straightforward; the other 
more nuanced. The simple explanation is the change in parties 
by John Jeffords, the one time Vermont Republican whose 
decision to leave the Republican Party shifted control of the 
Senate from Republican to Democratic hands. Before the 
Jeffords switch, Democrats . did not resist Rehnquist Court 
decision making because they were the minority party. Under 
this view, recent Rehnquist Court decision . making did pit 
Democrats (who dislike these decisions) against Republicans, 
but Democrats were powerless to do anything about it. Today, 
however, Senate Democrats can use the confirmation process 
as a vehicle to express their disapproval of the Court. 
I find this simple explanation unsatisfactory. While the 
Jeffords switch is important,. I do not think that Democratic 
complaints about the Rehnquist Court are tied either to party 
control of the Senate or Democratic disappointment with 
Rehnquist Court decision making. Instead, I will argue that 
lawmaker objections to the Rehnquist Court are, more than 
anything, tied to Democratic disapproval of the Republican 
Senate's treatment of Clinton-era nominees, the increasing (at 
least before September 11) polarization of Democratic and 
Republican leadership, a corresponding desire among Senate 
Democrats to exercise power, and bitterness over the Court's 
decision in Bush v. Gore.4 I will divide my comments into three 
parts. In Part I, I will explain that Rehnquist Court decisions 
hardly ever pit Democrats against Republicans and, as a result, 
that Congress is not particularly concerned with the individual 
on Docket, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2002, at Al. 
3. Hearings, for example, have been held on the appropriateness of rejecting 
Bush nominees because they do not provide ideological balance to this "far right" 
Court. 
4. 531 u.s. 98 (2000). 
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decisions of the Rehnquist Court. In Part II, I will demonstrate 
that lawmakers typically lack the incentives to attack Court 
decisions limiting Congress's power on federalism grounds. In 
Part III, I will explain why Senate Democrats nonetheless have 
good reason to use the Senate's confirmation power as a way to 
attack the Rehnquist Court. 
I. CONGRESSIONAL ACQUIESCENCE TO REHNQUIST COURT 
DECISION MAKING: THE IRRELEVANCE OF PARTY 
ALIGNMENTS 
The willingness of lawmakers to take aim at the Supreme 
Court is very much tied to partisan alignments within 
Congress. For example,· Court-curbing proposals are often a 
byproduct of shifting alignments within Congress-so that a 
majority with differing constitutional views than the Court's 
replaces a majority that generally accepts the Court's decision 
making.5 For this reason, treating the Jeffords switch as the 
proximate cause of the Democrats new-found opprobrium of 
Rehnquist Court decision making has intuitive appeal. Upon 
closer examination, however, this explanation fails. The laws 
the Court struck down cannot be characterized in such 
partisan terms. And when Congress has enacted legislation in 
response to Rehnquist Court rulings, it has done so in a 
·bipartisan way. 
Consider, for example, the most controversial of the 
Rehnquist Court's federalism decisions-those invalidating all 
or part of the Violence Against Women Act (VA W A), 6 the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 7 the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),8 the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 9 the Brady Act, 10 and the 
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990.11 With the exception of the 
VA WA and the ADEA, both Senate Democrats and Republicans 
5. See generally Stuart S. Nagel, Court-Curbing Periods in American 
History, 18 VAND. L. REV. 925 (1965) (detailing role of party alignments in Court-
curbing periods); Keith E. Whittington, Legislative Sanctions and the Strategic 
Environment of Judicial Review, 1 I-CON: INT'L J. CONST. L. (forthcoming July 
2003), available at http://www.princeton.edu/-kewhitt/strategic_context.pdf. 
6. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
7. Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
8. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
9. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
10. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
11. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
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co-sponsored each of these bills.12 And with the exception of 
the VAWA (where most Republicans voted against the 
measure), each of these bills was enacted without dissent.13 Of 
course, it may be that Republicans were not strong supporters 
of these measuresY Nonetheless, Republican co-sponsorship 
and Republican votes cannot be dismissed. 
12. The following table details the bipartisan nature of Congress's support 
for these measures· 
Gun-Free 
School Zone 
Act of 1990 
VAWAof 
ADEA Brady Bill (part of RFRA ADA 
Law: 1994 (PL 90-202)* (PL 103-159) Crime (PL 103-141) (PL 101-336) 
Control Act 
(PL 103-322) 
of 1990) 
(PL 101-647) 
Co- 138D 1D 124 D 45D 
6D 3D 
Sponsor(s): 17R 1R 47 R 18 R** 
Vote 
344-13 238-187 313-1 377-28 235-195 
(House): (D 192-11) (D 182-71) (D 178-0) (voice vote) (D 232-5) (D 189-64) (R 152-2) (R66-116) (R 135-1) (R 145-23) (R 46-131) 
97-3 91-6 61-38 
Vote 
(Senate): (voice vote) (voice vote) (voice vote) (D 54-2) (054-0) (D 52-2) (R43-1) (R37-6) (R7-36) 
House 0248 D 258 0260 D 258 D 260 0258 
Members: R 187 R 178 R 175 R 176 R 175 R 176 
Senate D64 057 055 D57 D55 D57 
Members: R36 R43 R45 R43 R46 R43 
InformatiOn garnered from Thomas and CIS Congresswnal Unwerse, except for 
* Vote info from Congressional Record and Age Discrimination, XXIII CONG. Q. 
ALMANAC 658, 659 (1967). 
** Thomas indicates one more co-sponsor than Congressional Universe for this 
Act. 
13. See id. 
14. Consider, for example, Adarand Constructors, Inc. u. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 
(1995), a 1995 decision restricting Congress's power to grant race-based 
preferences (without explicitly overruling any federal statute). Although 
Republicans typically vote in favor of affirmative action legislation, there is little 
reason to think that this support is heartfelt. For example, in explaining why 
many Senate Republicans joined Congress's 1998 reaffirmation of federal 
transportation set-asides, John McCain (R-Ariz.) argued that the costs of 
repudiating affirmative action were simply too high: "The danger exists that our 
[party's] aspirations and intentions will be misperceived, dividing our country and 
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More significantly, even if some of the statutes struck 
down were readily identifiable with Democratic interests, 
including the VA WA, the ADA, the ADEA, and the Brady Act, 
that characterization does not apply to several of the laws 
struck down, including the RFRA, the Line Item Veto Act,15 the 
Communications Decency Act (CDA), 16 Miranda override 
legislation, 17 and measures restricting the speech rights of 
public employees and the legal services corporation.18 Indeed, 
as William Marshall points out in his contribution to this 
symposium, decisions striking down these laws could be 
characterized as "extreme liberal activism."19 Consequently, 
even if the Rehnquist Court is activist, its activism has not 
exclusively targeted Democratic interests.20 
Not only do Rehnquist Court decisions fail to pit 
Republicans against Democrats, there is little reason to think 
that these decisions are of particular concern to Congress. For 
the most part, Congress has simply ignored these decisions. 
For example, the Congressional Record contains virtually no 
commentary about the Court's action in these cases. With 
three notable exceptions (the VA W A, the RFRA, and the Line 
Item Veto Act), no more than four comments exist about the 
wisdom of any of the Court's decisions.21 Likewise, a search of 
the Congressional Record suggests that Congress is not 
concerned about the precedential value of these decisions. 
Lawmakers have mentioned the precedential impact of City of 
Boerne v. Flores,22 which invalidated the RFRA, on only ten 
harming our party." 144 CONG. REC. S1490 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1998). 
15. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
16. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
17. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
18. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001); United States v. 
Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995) (public employees). 
19. William P. Marshall, Conservatives and the Seven Sins of Judicial 
Activism, 73 U. CoLO. L. REV. 1217, 1247 (2002). 
20. I do not mean to suggest here that the Rehnquist Court, in fact, is 
activist. As Ernest Young details in his contribution to this symposium, judicial 
activism is not easy to define-so much so that attacks on Rehnquist Court 
activism may operate more as a political broadside than a principled critique. 
Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 1139, 1141 (2002). 
21. LEXIS database search, Congressional Record, All Congress Combined, 
for "Court" and either the name of the case or relevant law for the period of one 
month following the date of the decision. 
22. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
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occasions,23 a startling fact when one considers that Boerne 
embraced a standard of review that significantly curtailed 
Congress's Section Five enforcement powers under the 14th 
Amendment. United States v. Lopez,24 the case that 
invalidated the Gun-Free School Zones Act, also has received 
limited attention in congressional debates. Notwithstanding 
the fact that Lopez was the first case in more than sixty years 
to declare a federal statute outside Congress's Commerce 
Clause power (and that it has since proven an instrumental 
precedent in invalidating the VA WA), lawmakers have 
mentioned Lopez's precedential impact only sixteen times. 25 
Finally, the Court's anticommandeering cases, Printz v. United 
States26 and New York v. United States27 have not figured into 
congressional deliberations. Members of Congress have 
mentioned the precedential value of New York six times;28 
members have mentioned the. precedential value of Printz only 
twice.29 
While these measures are somewhat artificial, they are 
nonetheless telling. At a minimum, they suggest that 
lawmakers are not especially troubled about Rehnquist Court 
decisions limiting Congress's power. For example, there is no 
talk of curbing the Court's jurisdiction, of amending the 
Constitution to nullify these decisions, of enacting legislation in 
23. LEXIS database search, Congressional Record, All Congress Combined, 
from June 25, 1997 (the date of the Boerne decision) to June 24, 2002. On nine 
other occasions, Boerne was mentioned-principally in connection with efforts to 
revamp the RFRA. See infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text (discussing 
Congress's response to Boerne). 
24. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
25. LEXIS database search, Congressional Record, All Congress Combined, 
from April 26, 1995 (the date of the Lopez decision) to June 24, 2002. On fourteen 
other occasions, Lopez was mentioned (nine times in connection with letters and 
memoranda entered into the Congressional Record; five times in connection with 
efforts to revamp the guns-in-schools law). 
26. 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (invalidating background check provision of the 
Brady Bill). 
27. 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (invalidating legislation requiring states to either 
find a way to dispose oflow-level radioactive waste or to "take title" of the waste). 
28. LEXIS database search, Congressional Record, Ail· Congress Combined, 
from June 19, 1992 (the date of the New York decision) until June 24, 2002. 
29. LEXIS database search, Congressional Record, All Congress Combined, 
from June 27, 1997 (the date of the Printz decision) to June 24, 2002. On several 
other occasions, members of Congress have introduced letters, memoranda, and 
resolutions that mention these cases-thirteen times for New York and three 
times for Printz. Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of 
Federalism: New York. Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 138. 
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open defiance of the Court's ruling, or of refusing to comply 
with these decisions.30 Instead, as suggested above, there is 
virtually no talk at all. Correspondingly, when Congress does 
respond to the Court, it has been compliant. It has treated 
Court rulings as final and authoritative-a precedent to deal 
with, not to overrule.31 Consider, for example, lawmaker 
efforts to respond to Court decisions invalidating the CDA, the 
Gun-Free School Zones Act, and the VAWA-three of the four 
statutes that Congress revised in response to Rehnquist Court 
decision making. 32 The legislative histories of all three statutes 
emphasize the need to conform with Supreme Court standards. 
The Children's On-line Protection Act,33 which replaced the 
CDA, "address[ed} the specific concerns raised by the Supreme 
Court,"34 including the lack of legislative hearings, the failure 
to consider less restrictive alternatives, and the overbroad 
definition of what constitutes indecency.35 Likewise, when a 
bipartisan coalition of senators introduced the Juvenile Justice 
and Delinquency Protection Act of 1996 (replacing the Gun 
Free School Zone Act),36 their agenda was simple: "to heed the 
30. These techniques are all examples of Court-curbing. See generally, 
LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES, 200-230 (1988). For a more detailed 
treatment of proposals stripping the Court of jurisdiction, see EDWARD KEYNES 
WITH RANDALL K. MILLER, THE COURT V. CONGRESS: PRAYER, BUSING & 
ABORTION (1989). 
31. I do not mean to suggest that everyone in Congress bows before the 
Court. On occasion; members of Congress have criticized Rehnquist Court 
decision making. And in one instance (Congress's post-Boerne efforts to revamp 
the RFRA), lawmakers considered enacting legislation casting doubt on the 
Court's ruling. See infra notes 77--81 and accompanying text. But these are 
exceptions to quite an overwhelming pattern of lawmaker disinterest or 
acquiescence. 
32. Congress also responded to the Court's decision invalidating the RFRA. 
See infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text. Legislation responding to the 
Court's age discrimination decision, Kimel, was introduced by a bipartisan 
coalition oflawmakers in May 2001. See 147 CONG. REC. S5458 (daily ed. May 
22, 2001) (statement of Sen. Jeffords). Legislation has also been introduced to 
overturn some of the Court's sovereign immunity decisions. In June 1999 and 
November 2001, Senator Patrick Leahy introduced legislation that would make 
states liable for violations of federal intellectual property laws. 147 CONG. REC. 
Sl1,364 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy). The 1999 bill died in 
committee; the 2001 bill is now being considered by the Senate Judiciary 
Committee. 
33. 15 u.s.c. § 6501 (2002). 
34. H.R. REP. No. 105-775, at 12 (1998). 
35. Id. 
36. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(a) (2002). When the Act was introduced, it was 
called the Gun Free School Zone Act of 1995. 141 CoNG. REC. S7919 (daily ed. 
June 7, 1995). 
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Supreme Court's decision regarding Federal power and yet to 
continue to fight against school violence."37 Finally, when 
responding to the decision overturning VA WA, a bipartisan 
coalition of lawmakers (including John Ashcroft (R-Mo.), Paul 
Wellstone (D-Minn.), Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), and Joseph Eiden 
(D-Del.)) made no effort to revive the right to sue provision 
struck down by the Supreme Court. 38 Instead, lawmakers 
focused their energies on federal funding directed at the 
prevention of domestic violence. 39 
To summarize: There is little reason to think that Senate 
Democrat complaints about the Rehnquist Court are tied to 
party control of the Senate. Rehnquist Court decision making 
has targeted both liberal and conservative causes. Moreover, 
most of the federal laws the Rehnquist Court struck down were 
bipartisan measures. Finally, members of Congress have had 
precious little to say about Court decisions striking down their 
handiwork-suggesting that lawmakers are not particularly 
concerned with the individual decisions of the Rehnquist Court. 
Indeed, when responding to Court decisions, lawmakers devote 
their attention to complying with Court edicts, not criticizing 
the Court. 
II. WHY LAWMAKERS HAVE LITTLE INCENTIVE TO ATTACK 
REHNQUIST COURT FEDERALISM DECISIONS 
The question remains: If the Rehnquist Court, by striking 
down Republican, Democratic, and bipartisan initiatives, is an 
equal-opportunity activist, what explains Congress's apparent 
disinterest (at least before Bush-era confirmation battles) in 
these decisions? I think there are two explanations. The first 
is quite narrow and contextual, and focuses both on the 
specifics of the decisions and the social and political forces 
surrounding these decisions. In particular, Rehnquist Court 
37. Id. at 87920 (statement of Sen. Kohl); see also Guns in Schools: A 
Federal Role?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Youth Violence of the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 9 (1995) (statement of Walter Dellinger, 
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel) (explaining how the statute 
conforms to Lopez). 
38. On the House side, however, some Democratic lawmakers sought 
(unsuccessfully) to include a civil legal remedy in the statute. H.R. REP. No. 106-
891, at n.31 (2000). 
39. The Violence Against Women Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 
1491 (codified as enacted, amended and repealed sections of 8, 18, 20, 28, 42 
U.S.C.). 
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decision making is narrow enough to allow Congress to address 
the same issue through an alternative source of federal power, 
especially Congress's spending power.40 Moreover, these 
decisions are in sync with increasing populist distrust of 
Congress.41 In contrast to this narrow explanation, the second 
explanation is quite broad. Specifically, Congress typically 
lacks incentives to respond to Supreme Court federalism 
decisions. In part, lawmakers and interest group lobbies pay 
little attention to federalism qua federalism. Their interest, 
instead, lies in the substantive issues that the Court examines, 
such as the environment, labor, and civil rights. Furthermore, 
when it comes to federalism, Court rulings rarely foreclose 
democratic solutions. Lawmakers at both the federal and state 
level can return to the substantive issues implicated by the 
Court's federalism decision making. 
A. The Narrow Explanation 
In large measure, Rehnquist Court federalism decisions 
have not destabilized either Congress or the interest groups 
that lobby Congress.42 As such, it is little wonder that 
Congress, a reactive institution,43 sees these decisions as no 
more than a blip on its radar screen. Specifically, Rehnquist 
Court federalism decisions have not prevented Congress from 
responding to constituent demands. The Court, while 
invalidating scores of federal laws, has only had to overturn 
three of its precedents.44 More significantly, most of these 
40. For additional discussion, see infra note 45. 
41. For additional discussion, see infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. 
42. For a more detailed discussion of my thinking on this subject, see Neal 
Devins, Congress as Culprit: How Lawmakers Spurred on the Court's Anti-
Congress Crusade, 51 DUKE L.J. 435 (2001). 
43. For the classic treatment of how lawmakers respond to "fire alarms" 
triggered by constituents, see Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, 
Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 165 (1984). 
44. See College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 
527 U.S. 666, 680 (1999) (rejecting the constructive waiver doctrine of Parden v. 
Terminal Railway, 377 U.S. 184 (1964)); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 
66 (1996) (rejecting Congress's power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment via a 
statute enacted under the Commerce Clause, overturning Pennsylvania v. Union 
Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989)); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 
(1995) (holding that federal affirmative action programs are subject to strict 
scrutiny review, not intermediate review, overturning Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. 
FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990)). For a competing view (focusing on how political 
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decisions have been narrow in scope, striking down only parts 
of the statute and/or allowing Congress an opportunity to 
revisit the issue by making use of another source of federal 
power.45 Also, because much of what is struck down is 
duplicative of state enactments,46 Congress has felt relatively 
little constituent pressure to respond to the Court. And finally, 
many of the statutes struck down relate to issues, especially 
crime, where politicians may· care more about taking a position 
(by voting for the legislation) than they care about the 
successful implementation of the law. 47 
Popular attitudes towards lawmaking and, 
correspondingly, Congress's increasing emphasis on message 
politics also explains Congress's failure to target Rehnquist 
Court decision making. Before the September 11 terrorist 
attacks, voters looked less and less to Congress to solve the 
nation's problems. Distrust of the federal government and, 
with it, low expectations of congressional performance hit 
record levels.48 With voters expecting less and less from 
Congress, the lawmaking culture has been radically 
transformed. For example, rather than blame the Supreme 
Court for standing in the way of lawmaker initiatives, 
Congress is more apt to blame itself for the failings of 
conservatives have little regard for precedent), see Marshall, supra note 19, at 
1232-36. See also Michael Stokes Paulsen, Activist Judicial Restraint (2002) 
(unpublished manuscript prepared for this symposium) (arguing that stare decisis 
is a type of judicial activism and, as such, adherence to precedent is itself activist). 
45. In this symposium, see Young, supra note 20, at 1167-68 (characterizing 
Rehnquist Court decision making as "minimalist" in character). See generally 
Adrian Vermeule, Does Commerce Clause Review Have Perverse Effects?, 46 VILL. 
L. REV. 1325 (2001) (arguing that Congress can enact more comprehensive 
regulatory schemes than those struck down by the Court); T.R. Goldman, 
Lawmakers Take Steps to Respond After Legislation is Found Unconstitutional, 
LEGAL TIMES, July 14, 1997, at 8 (same). 
46. States, for example, regularly criminalize gun possession at schools and 
domestic violence. More generally, Congress often enacts criminal statutes which 
do little more than duplicate state laws, including drug crimes, caijacking, failure 
to pay child support, embezzlement from an insurance company, and drive-by 
shootings. Edwin Meese III, Big Brother on the Beat: The Expanding 
Federalization of Crime, 1 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 3 (1997); Seth P. Waxman, Does 
the Solicitor General Matter?, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1123 (2001) (casting doubt 
on the necessity of the VAWA). 
47. See Keith E. Whittington, Taking What They Give Us: Explaining the 
Court's Federalism Offensive, 51 DUKE L.J. 477, 511-13 (2001). 
48. For a detailing of opinion polls and a thoughtful examination of how 
voter distrust has contributed to Rehnquist Court decision making, see 
Christopher H. Schroeder, Causes of the Recent Turn in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 51· DUKE L.J. 307 (2001). 
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government by pushing such measures as term limit proposals 
and the line item veto.49 Correspondingly, by placing more 
emphasis on their parties' message, and less emphasis on 
legislative outputs,50 Republicans and Democrats alike discount 
what happens to legislation after it is enacted-including a 
court decision striking down legislation. 51 
Finally, Congress is not particularly disappointed with 
Court decision making. Unlike Court-curbing periods, many 
members of Congress are sympathetic to the Court's efforts to 
protect state prerogatives. 52 For this very reason, 
Representative Lee Hamilton (D-Ind.), after observing that 
lawmakers seemed "detached from the actual work of the 
federal judiciary," speculated that Congress "has become more 
conservative, and many members are comfortable with most of 
the Court's rulings."53 Moreover, Congress was on notice that 
its handiwork was vulnerable to judicial challenges. For 
example, when enacting the RFRA and the VAWA, academic 
experts, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and the Judicial Conference 
signaled that these laws were constitutionally suspect. 54 More 
49. On the line item veto, for example, Sen. Dan Coats (R-Ind.) and others 
argued: Congress "cannot discipline itself. . . [It) is selfish and greedy and ... 
cannot put the national interest ahead of parochial interests or special interests." 
Line-Item Veto: Joint Hearing Before the House Comm. on Government Reform 
and Oversight and the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 104th Cong. 22 
(1995). 
50. See generally C. Lawrence Evans, Committees, Leaders and Message 
Politics, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 217 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. 
Oppenheimer eds., 7th ed. 2000). For additional discussion of message politics, 
see infra notes 92-99 and accompanying text. 
51. Along the same lines, lawmakers, rather than negotiate with the White 
House over the terms of legislation, often enact legislation "deliberately designed 
to provoke a presidential veto." John B. Gilmour, Institutional and Individual 
Influences on the President's Veto, 64 J. POL. 198 (2002). 
52. Whittington, supra note 47, at 512-15 (noting that lawmakers are not 
upset by Rehnquist Court federalism decision making because lawmakers still 
reap political benefits for voting on laws criminalizing gun possession, gender-
related violence, etc.). 
53. 144 CONG. REC. E48-01 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1998) (statement of Rep. 
Hamilton). See also supra notes 21-39 and accompanying text (suggesting that 
Congress is not especially interested in whether the judiciary upholds its 
handiwork-so long as lawmakers are able to reward constituents through the 
bills they approve); Devins, supra note 42, at 461 (same). 
54. For example, in 1992 (in a piece that took aim at the proposed VAWA), 
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that Congress ought to "avoiq adding new federal 
causes of action unless critical to meeting important national interests that 
cannot otherwise be satisfied through nonjudicial forums, alternative dispute 
resolution techniques, or the state courts." William H. Rehnquist, Congress Is 
Crippling Federal Courts, Ever-Expanding Number of 'Federal' Crimes Belong in 
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telling, concerns over the possible success of a court challenge 
prompted Congress to provide for expedited Supreme Court 
review .. of the CDA, the Line Item Veto Act, and census reform 
legislation. 55 
The Rehnquist Court's willingness to strike down federal 
statutes coincides with Congress's increasing willingness to see 
Supreme Court decisions as final and authoritative and, 
correspondingly, its practice of placing less emphasis on what 
happens to legislation after it is enacted. 56 With the public 
expecting less from Congress, moreover, these decisions reflect 
populist norms. It is little wonder therefore that Congress is 
loathe to attack the Court for its decision making. And since 
lawmakers can revisit the issue by making use of an 
alternative source of federal power, Rehnquist Court 
federalism decisions do not prevent Congress from responding 
to constituent pressures. 
B. The Broad Explanation 
Congress's disinterest in recent Supreme Court federalism 
decisions can also be attributed to the fact that Congress does 
not care about federalism qua federalism. 57 Federalism's 
saliency corresponds to the substantive issues that the Court 
examines (domestic violence, religious liberty, disability rights, 
State Courts Instead, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 16, 1992, at 3B. By 
extending Rehnquist's complaint to the Gun Free School Zone Act (invalidated in 
Lopez), Congress should have been aware of the judiciary's growing skepticism of 
the federalization of crime. Also, with respect to the RFRA, law professor 
witnesses warned Congress that the statute was constitutionally suspect 
(especially if Congress failed to make extensive findings of fact, something that 
Congress failed to do). See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 331 (1992) (testimony of Professor Douglas 
Laycock); id. at 390-91 (testimony of Professor Ira C. Lupu). 
55. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 
133, 142-43; Line Item Veto Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200, 
1211; Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and Related 
Agencies Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, 111 Stat. 2440, 2482 
(1997). 
56. And this, of course, is both a byproduct and a cause of voters' lower 
expectations for congressional performance (at least before September 11). See 
supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
57. In sharp contrast, New Deal lawmakers cared a great deal about 
Lochner Court decision making because "it rendered impossible the central 
political goals of the newly empowered Democratic Party." Whittington, supra 
note 47, at 509. 
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etc.), not the question of the appropriate division of power 
between the federal and state government. Thus, when 
responding to federalism decisions that implicate civil and 
individual rights, Congress has little incentive to strip the 
Court of jurisdiction, amend the Constitution, or engage in 
other Court-curbing activities. Instead, its incentives cut in 
favor of enacting alternative legislation consistent with the 
Court's decision. 
In concluding that today's Congress is uninterested in 
federalism qua federalism, I looked at the following sources: 
judicial confirmation hearings, party platforms, interest group 
web pages, opinion polls, and lawmaker commentary on 
Supreme Court federalism decisions. None of these sources 
suggest that federalism, by itself, significantly interests 
Congress and its constituents.58 Lawmakers barely mentioned 
federalism, for example, in the confirmation hearings, 
committee reports, or floor debates concerning Supreme Court 
nominees Sandra Day O'Connor, Clarence Thomas, David 
Souter, and Stephen Breyer.59 In the cases of O'Connor and 
Souter, this disinterest is especially telling. O'Connor called 
attention to the fact that her "experience[s] as a State court 
judge and as a state legislator" gave her "a greater appreciation 
of the important role that States play in our federal system."60 
Souter, the so-called "stealth nominee," had no known views on 
federalism-suggesting that the Senate had real incentives to 
question him on matters that critically concerned Judiciary 
Committee members.61 Similarly, interest groups steered clear 
58. Admittedly, my research was selective. For example, I did not look at 
every judicial confirmation hearing; instead, I focused on hearings where I 
thought federalism issues might come up. At the same time, the paucity of 
references to federalism-qua-federalism suggests that my conclusion is defensible. 
For a related argument, see generally ROBERT F. NAGEL, THE IMPLOSION OF 
AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2001) (observing that national players do not value state 
contributions and, as such, are apt to degenerate federalism). 
59. With respect to Justices Thomas and Breyer, federalism issues were 
largely ignored in Senate questioning of the nominees. According to my survey of 
these confirmation hearings, Thomas was only asked twice and Breyer was only 
asked once about federalism. 
60. The Nomination of Judge Sandra Day O'Connor of Arizona to Serve as 
an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before 
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 59 (1981). O'Connor was asked 
four questions about federalism-related issues. There were no federalism-related 
references in the Judiciary Committee report supporting her nomination. 
61. Souter was asked four questions about federalism during his three days 
of testimony. There were no federalism-related references in the Judiciary 
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of federalism-related issues when testifying about these 
nominees. For example, with the exception of the Coalition for 
America, no interest group testified (or, for that matter, wrote 
Congress) about federalism-related issues at either the Thomas 
or Breyer confirmation hearings.62 
Just as federalism issues are not a predominant concern 
for Congress, federalism issues likewise are not a concern of 
interest group lobbies. Federalism and other structural 
matters are not at the heart of the "mission statements" of 
these groups, especially left-leaning interests.63 Likewise, 
opinion polls suggest that federalism decisions, even those 
implicating individual rights, are of little interest to the 
public.64 Indeed, although the Gallup Organization conducted 
opinion polls on Rehnquist Court rulings on partial birth 
abortion, physician assisted suicide, the Boy Scouts' exclusion 
of gays, and student-led prayer, it did not bother to conduct 
polls on any of the Rehnquist Court's federalism decisions.65 
Against this backdrop, it is little wonder that party platforms 
gloss over federalism.66 Along the same lines, the handful of 
Committee report supporting his nomination. News coverage of Souter's 
confirmation likewise ignored federalism. A survey of stories and editorials run in 
The New York Times, The Washington Post, The L.A. Times, and The Wall Street 
Journal reveals that federalism received one or two passing references and 
nothing else. 
62. A quick scan of interest group testimony at the O'Connor and Souter 
confirmation hearings likewise suggests interest group lack of interest in 
federalism. 
63. I looked at web sites for the following groups: the National Organization 
for Women, the National Women's Law Center, the National Abortion Rights 
Action League, the ACLU, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, and the AFL-CIO. 
While some web pages condemn recent federalism decisions, they do so against 
the backdrop of the group's substantive agenda, e.g., women's rights, anti-
discrimination protections in the workplace. As to why I looked at these groups as 
well as the relevance of interest groups in shaping lawmaker consideration of 
constitutional questions, see Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Lobbying for 
Justice: Organized Interests, Supreme Court Nominations, and the United States 
Senate, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 499 (1998). 
64. And while the public does not tell the Gallup organization what issues 
are of interest to it, I do think it reasonable to look to opinion polls as one measure 
of what is and is not salient. Moreover, when it comes to Supreme Court decision 
making, the sad fact is that the public is hardly ever aware of Court decisions. 
See David Adamany & Joel B. Grossman, Support for the Supreme Court as a 
National Policymaker, 5 LAW & POL 'y Q. 405, 407 (1983) (citing studies). 
65. Likewise, presidential candidates George W. Bush and Al Gore were not 
asked about the Court's federalism decisions in any of their presidential debates. 
66. Judicial enforcement of federalism was not mentioned in either the 2000 
Democratic or Republican Party Platforms. The Democratic platform emphasized 
the need for "women and minorities" to fill judicial vacancies as well as the need 
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lawmakers who have criticized Rehnquist Court federalism 
decisions typically focus their energies on civil and individual 
rights concerns, not the balance of power implications of these 
decisions. 67 
No doubt, Congress and its constituents see Supreme 
Court federalism decision making as a second-order issue. Its 
salience is linked to the civil and individual rights issues that, 
for lawmakers and their constituents, define the Court. 68 
Rehnquist-era federalism decisim1 making, however, implicates 
civil and individual rights. By limiting Congress's power to 
regulate noneconomic activity (VA WA) and to extend civil 
rights protections against the states (RFRA, ADA, ADEA), 
Rehnquist Court federalism decision· making has limited the 
political victories of women's interests, the disabled, senior 
citizens, and religious minorities.69 
Why then hasn't Congress launched any meaningful attack 
against Rehnquist Court decisio:q. making? More to the point, 
are the explanations suggested above enough to explain 
for courts to protect "individual rights . . . including the right to privacy." 
Prosperity, Progress, and Peace 26, available at Democratic National Committee, 
About the DNC, Democratic Party Platform http://www.democrats.org/ 
about/platform.html (last visited May 29, 2002). The Republican Platform spoke 
of "judicial supremacy" and "[a]varice among ... plaintiffs' lawyers." Government 
for the People 4, available at Republican National Committee, About our Party, 
Platform http://www.rnc.org/GOPinfo/Platform/2000platform7 (last visited May 
20, 2002). The Republican Platform also expressed concern over court's 
invalidating citizen referenda. Those laws, however, have not been invalidated on 
federalism grounds. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating 
Colorado initiative implicating gay rights on equal protection grounds). 
67. I do not mean to suggest that balance of powers concerns are .never 
raised by Congress. In particular, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) and Senator 
Joseph Biden (D-Del.) have. both criticized the Court for improperly second 
guessing congressional factfinding. See 146 CONG. REC. S7758 (daily ed. July 27, 
2000) (statement of Sen. Leahy); id. at S7590 (statement of Sen. Biden). For 
further discussion, see infra notes 77-80. 
68. For an insightful explanation on why it is that courts-in bargaining 
with Congress and the White House over the scope of their powers-see individual 
rights as the source of their power, see John 0. McGinnis, Constitutional Review 
by the Executive in Foreign Affairs and War Powers: A Consequence of Rational 
Choice in the Separation of Powers, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 293, 306-07 
(1993). 
69. African-American interests also have reason to fear the Rehnquist 
Court. In particular, the logic of the Court's Section Five decision making is in 
tension with voting rights legislation. See Ellen Katz, The End of Reconstruction: 
Congres, Race, and Political Participation in the Rehnquist and Waite Courts 
(2002) (unpublished manuscript prepared for: this symposium); see also Marshall, 
supra note 19, at 1246 (calling attention to ways that the Rehnquist Court has 
facilitated non-minority challenges to race preferences). 
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Congress's acquiescence? The answer is a qualified "no." Even 
if it strongly disapproves of federalism-based decision making, 
Congress has little incentive to attack the Court when, and if, 
it responds to these decisions. Specifically, lawmakers and 
interest groups can find ways to respond to the Court's 
federalism decisions without seeking to curb the Court's 
jurisdiction or otherwise attack it. For example, if Congress 
does not like a decision, it can make use of alternative theories 
of power.70 Also, several of the decisions left much of the 
relevant statutory program in effect,71 allowed for injunctive 
relief,72 and/or spoke of ways in which Congress could respond 
to the decision.73 Finally, other governmental actors-states 
and municipalities-can fill the void when Congress cannot.74 
In other words, because Rehnquist-era federalism decisions 
allow elected officials and interest groups other avenues to 
pursue the same objectives as the laws that the Court struck 
down, Congress has little reason to pursue politically costly 
Court-curbing proposals. 75 
In contrast, a ruling limiting governmental power over 
civil and individual rights, such as abortion, school prayer, flag 
burning, or busing, settles the issue for all parts of government. 
Consider, for example, abortion. After Roe, no unit of 
government could regulate first trimester abortions. And while 
70. See supra note 45. 
71. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
72. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
73. See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
74. Following Garrett (ADA) and Boerne (RFRA), for example, several states 
enacted legislation providing for the very protections that the Supreme Court 
ruled that Congress was without the authority to mandate. See Helen Irvin, 
Several States Respond to Garrett Decision, Consider Waiving Immunity to ADA 
Lawsuits, 70 U.S.L.W. 2003 (2001) (discussing bills introduced in the immediate 
aftermath of Garrett, including legislation introduced in Minnesota, Rhode Island, 
California, and New York); Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious 
Exemptions, 46 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1465 (1999) (discussing state RFRAs). Also, 
several states criminalize domestic violence (the subject of the VAWA) and gun 
possession near schools (the subject of the Gun-Free School Zones Act). See supra 
note 46. 
75. For a recent treatment of the political costs of Court-curbing, see 
generally John Ferejohn, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining 
Judicial IndepAndence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 353 (1999). For additional discussion, 
see infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text. And if that is not enough, Congress 
is limited in the ways it can curb the Court in response to its federalism decisions; 
for example, it makes little sense to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction on 
issues in which the courts are needed to enforce congressional mandates. 
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government could express its disapproval of this decision 
through appropriations riders and other indirect techniques, it 
could only attack the heart of the decision by attacking the 
decision itself. For this reason, Roe prompted proposals to strip 
the courts of jurisdiction, to amend the Constitution, and to 
enact human life legislation. 76 
No federalism-related decision backs government into a 
similar corner. This, of course, is not to say that these 
decisions are inconsequential, but rather that, when 
responding to these decisions, elected officials need not resort 
to Court-curbing techniques. When thinking about these 
decisions, Congress has more incentive to rewrite the law to 
correct the defect that the Court identified than it has to get 
the Court to rethink its federalism jurisprudence. 
One possible exception to this rule is Congress's response 
to Boerne (the decision invalidating the RFRA), but this is the 
exception that proves the soundness of the rule. Unlike the 
calm that has followed other Rehnquist-era federalism 
decisions, Boerne prompted numerous expressions of 
disappointment with the Court, several legislative hearings, 
and, on one occasion, talk of Court-curbing. 77 At the same time, 
federalism played no role in all of this. Instead, Congress 
focused on its disapproval of the Supreme Court's restrictive 
approach to religious liberty.78 Specifically, when Congress 
enacted the RFRA, Congress was responding to Employment 
Division v. Smith, a 1990 Supreme Court decision allowing 
government to burden religious exercise without satisfying 
either prong of strict scrutiny review. 79 As such, like the 
76. For a detailing of government responses to Roe, see BARBARA CRAIG 
HINKSON & DAVID M. O'BRIEN, ABORTION AND AMERICAN POLITICS (1993). 
77. For hearings focusing on possible legislative responses to Boerne, see 
Protecting Religious Freedom After Boerne v. Flores: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 
(1997); Congress' Constitutional Role in Protecting Religious Liberty: Hearing 
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997). For hearings 
(prompted by Boerne) discussing Court-curbing and other legislative checks on the 
judiciary, see Congress, the Court, and the Constitution: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 
(1998). 
78. See Neal Devins, How Not to Challenge the Court, 39 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 645 (1998) (portraying the RFRA as special interest legislation, with 
lawmakers validating religious interest group criticisms of Supreme Court 
religious liberty decision making). 
79. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Rather than require the government to satisfy 
either the compelling interest prong or least restrictive prong of strict scrutiny 
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human life legislation designed statutorily to overturn Roe, the 
RFRA was Congress's attempt stautorily to. ov_erturn Supreme 
Court standards governing religious liberty.80 Lawmakers 
never lost sight of this rights-oriented objective and the 
wrongness of Smith remained the focus of hearings and 
legislation responding to Boerne.81 
The lesson here is simple: Congress is a reactive 
institution and, consequently, Supreme Court rulings 
invalidating federal or state legislation operate as fire alarms 
demanding a response. On rights issues, the only effective 
response may involve one or another Court-curbing technique. 
Regarding federalism, lawmakers and their constituents may 
avail themselves of less draconian techniques. Of course, were 
the Rehnquist Court to step up its anti-Congress campaign and 
issue decisions that further narrow Congress's power, retooling 
federalism decision making may become the only way for 
Congress and its constituents to advance their agenda. Until 
that time, however, there is little incentive for either 
Democrats or Republicans in Congress to respond to individual 
federalism decisions by seeking a broader reexamination of the 
Court's jurisprudence. 
review, Smith embraced deferential rational basis review. 
80. The legislative history of the RFRA is filled with statements to this 
effect. Smith, for example, was condemned as "disastrous," "dastardly and 
unprovoked," "devastating," and "degrad[ing]." 139 CONG. REC. H2359 (1993) 
(statement of Rep. Nadler); 137 CONG. REC. E2422 (1991) (statement of Rep. 
Solarz); 139 CONG. REC. H2361 (statement of Rep. Schumer); id. (statement of 
Rep. Orton). For his part, President Clinton, when signing the bill, spoke of his 
conviction that the RFRA "is far more consistent with the intent of the Founders 
of this Nation than the [Smith] decision." Remarks on Signing the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2000 (Nov. 16, 1993). 
81. Witness, for example, Senator Orrin Hatch's (R-Utah) opening 
comments at 1998 hearings· on the Religious Liberty Protection Act. After 
observing that this "legislation seeks to protect the right of religious freedom in 
cooperation with the Supreme Court," Hatch remarked: "Clearly, it would have 
been preferable if the Court r~turned to its previous [pre-Smith] solicitude for 
religious liberty claims. But, until it does, this Congress will do what it can to 
protect religious freedom: in cooperation with the Court." The Religious Liberty 
and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1998: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 1 (1998). 
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III. WHY SENATE DEMOCRATS HAVE STRONG INCENTIVES TO 
ATTACK REHNQUIST COURT DECISION MAKING WHEN 
CONFIRMING BUSH JUDICIAL APPOINTEES 
The confirmation process operates around a different set of 
incentives than federalism decision making. While Senate 
Democrats have little incentive to attack Rehnquist-era 
federalism decision making as."activist," they have quite strong 
incentives to speak of "conservative judicial activism" when 
battling President Bush's judicial nominees.82 In so doing, 
Senate Democrats may well make Rehnquist-era federalism 
decisions the focal point of confirmation battles with both the 
Bush White House and their Republican colleagues. And while 
the Jeffords switch (for reasons I will soon explain) helps fuel 
this campaign against "conservative judicial activism," the 
incentives for Senate Democrats to resist Bush judicial 
appointees, ultimately, has relatively little to do with which 
party controls the Senate. 
Democrats will always have incentive to attack the judicial 
appointees of a Republican president and Republicans will 
always have incentive to attack Democratic appointees.83 
Specifically, the forward-looking nature of the confirmation 
process exacerbates increasing polarization within Congress, 
including each party's desire to send a distinctive message and 
pay the other party back for its partisan decision making. 
Correspondingly, because Court decision making is 
consequential (especially on civil and individual rights), 
lawmakers often see the confirmation process as a politically 
salient way to advance their ideological preferences. In the 
82. When politicians speak of "judicial activism," I think that they are 
making use of an empty label to achieve a political result. For more detailed 
elaborations of this point, see Mark V. Tushnet, The Role of the Supreme Court: 
Judicial Activism or Self-Restraint?, 47 MD. L. REV. 147 (1987); William Wayne 
Justice, The Two Faces of Judicial Activism, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1992). See 
also Taylor, supra note 2, at 1816. 
83. For this very reason, Senate Democrats-before the Jeffords switch-
signaled Republicans that they were willing to go to war over federal judicial 
nominations; in particular, by fighting hard against confirming Ted Olson 
(Solicitor General) and John Ashcroft (Attorney General), Senate Democrats made 
clear that they were willing to do what it takes to derail unacceptable Bush 
nominees. See Alison Mitchell, Senate Confirms Ashcroft as Attorney General, 58· 
42, Closing a Five-Week Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2001, at A1 (the Senate was 
"sending Mr. Bush 'as clear a message as we can' about future nominations, 
particularly for the Supreme Court."); Neil A. Lewis, Panel Still Split on Solicitor 
General Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2001, at A21. 
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pages that follow, I will flesh out the above explanation by way 
of a laundry list of (somewhat overlapping) .themes explaining 
why Senate Democrats likely will treat recent federalism 
decisions as a focal point of controversial confirmation 
hearings: 
Federalism as Proxy. Because Rehnquist Court federalism 
decision making is very much linked to civil and individual 
rights, a nominee's views on these Rehnquist Court decisions 
aguably act as a proxy to gauge how that nominee will 
approach all issues implicating civil and individual rights. 
Mter all, common sense suggests · that a judge who 
embraces states' rights arguments is ·more skeptical of top-
down national solutions-whether their source is Congress ot 
the courts-than a judge who is skeptical of states' rights. Put 
another way, for a judge who embraces state and local control, 
why should it matter if the .national solution emanates from 
Congress (the ADA, the VAWA, the RFRA, etc.), or from the 
courts through expansive interpretations of statutes and 
constitutional provisions implicating civil and individual 
rights? Consequently, even for Senators and interest groups 
that do not care all that much about federalism, these cases 
may nevertheless serve as a good measuring stick of a nominee . 
. The Forward-Looking Nature of Confirmation Hearings. 
The widely held belief that the Court is trustworthy, especially 
as compared to Congress, limits Congress's power to attack 
indh;·idual Supreme Court decisions.84 In contrast, judicial 
nominees cannot claim that they have a vested right to Senate 
confirmation. Consequently, while Congress will pay an 
institutional price when it responds to Court decision making 
through Court-curbing proposals, 85 almost no consequences 
stem from resisting White House efforts to fill the federal 
84. Eighty-one percent of Americans, in a June 2001 Gallup poll, said that 
they have "some," "quite a lot," or a "great deal" of confidence in the Supreme 
Court. Gallup Poll, Roper Center for Public Opinion (June 8-10, 2001) (on file 
with author). For data showing widespread distrust of Congress, see Schroeder, 
supra note 48, at 346-349. . See also ·Barry Friedman, The History of the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law's Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971 
(2000) (highlighting public support for Supreme Court's legitimacy at the very 
time that FDR challenged that legitimacy through his Court-packing proposal). 
85. See Ferejohn, supra note 75, at 357; Whittington, supra note 5, at 17-18. 
It is also noteworthy that FDR suffered huge costs for his Court-packing proposal. 
In particular, "[t)he conservative opposition to Roosevelt crystallized around the 
Court issue." David M. Kennedy, How FDR Derailed the New Deal, ATLANTIC 
MONTHLY, July 1995, at 87. 
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bench with judges sympathetic to the president's agenda. For 
example, Senators ·can talk about how.future appointees may 
undermine Roe, the separation of church and state, and so on.86 
By· speaking in such forward-looking generalities, Senate 
Democrats can target nominees for things they have not done, 
but may do. These types of forward-looking attacks, moreover, 
are difficult to defend against, because it is impossible for. a 
nominee to prove that she will not behave a certain way in the 
future. 
The· Packaging of Federalism Decisions. For Senate 
Democrats (many of whom are interested in derailing Bush 
judicial appointees),87 Rehnquist Court federalism decisions are 
far easier to package than Court decisions on abortion, religion, 
speech, gay rights, and stare decisis. 88 In particular, the Court 
has not acted monolithically in its substantive civil and 
individual rights decisions-issuing several important rulings 
that have either expanded or preserved civil rights and 
individual liberties.89 In contrast, no important federalism 
cases exist which reaffirm Congress's power to protect civil and 
individual rights90 and, as such, the federalism cases can be 
86. The classic example · of such a parade of future horribles is the Bork 
confirmation hearing. For an insider's account-of how the anti-Bork forces sought 
to attack Bork t}).is way, S(le MARK GITENSTEIN, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE, 95-98 
(1992). 
87. As to why Democrats are interested in limiting Bush this way, seflinfra 
notes 100-108 and accompanying text. 
. 88. On race issues, it is easier to cast the Rehnquist Court as "anti-civil 
rights." For example, as Bill Marshall points out in his contribution to this 
symposium, several Court rulings can be seen as setbacks to minority interests. 
See Marshall, supra note 19, at 1227-29. At the same time, the Court has yet to 
invalidate a federal affirmative action program. Also, it has ruled that race can 
be used as a factor in districting. Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999). 
Finally, it has reaffirmed Congress's authority to enact voting rights legislation. 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997). 
89. See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 530 U.S. 533 (2001) 
(invalidating restrictions on the use of federal funds by legal services); Stenberg v. 
Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (invalidating Nebraska's partial birth abortion 
statute); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (reaffirming and 
extending Miranda on· stare decisis grounds); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 
530 U.S. 290 (2000) (extending school prayer decision to student-led prayer at a 
football game); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (invalidating Communications 
Decency Act); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating Colorado 
legislation prohibiting the granting of "protected status" to gays and lesbians); 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, . 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (invoking stare decisis to 
uphold Roe). 
90. There is one arguable exception here, namely, City of Boerne u. Flores 
(RFRA). 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Specifically, the Boerne Court made clear that its 
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packaged together in a way that civil and individual rights 
cases cannot. Moreover., . the .federalism ,cases. act as a better 
focal point because they cut across a broad· range of interests, 
including those of women's groups, the disabled, the aged, and 
religious minorities. 91 
Symbolic and Message Politics. Judicial appointments, 
especially Supreme Court appointments, are high visibility 
events. Interest groups sometimes announce their opposition 
to a candidate by taking out full page ads in major newspapers. 
Television and other media coverage is extensive and a 
plethora of books discuss controversial confirmation hearings. 
Given the real world and symbolic importance of the 
appointment process, it is little wonder that Democrats would 
want to use·confirmation hearings as a way of communicating 
to voters and interest group constituents that they are the 
party of civil and individual rights.92 As a result, Republicans 
and Democrats increasingly see the lawmaking process as 
expressive-a way for the members of each party to coalesce 
behind the party's policy agenda. 93 By focusing their efforts on 
decision invalidating the RFRA did not put into doubt earlier Court rulings 
affirming 1960s voting rights legislation. 521 U.S. at 518. At the same time, as 
Ellen Katz points out in her contribution to this symposium, the Rehnquist 
Court's Section Five cases cast doubt on the 1982 amendments to the Voting 
Rights Act. Katz, supra note 69. 
91. Old habits die hard, of course. And it may be that the chestnuts used to 
attack Bork and Thomas (privacy, stare decisis, etc.) may again emerge as the 
principal line of attack against Bush nominees. Consider, for example, the Senate 
Judiciary Committee's rejection of Bush appeals court nominee Priscilla Owen. 
See Neil A. Lewis, Democrats Reject Bush Pick in Battle Over Court Balance, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 6, 2002, at Al. Specifically, Senate Democrats attacked Owen as 
being a ''judicial activist" because, as a Texas Supreme Court Justice, she broadly 
interpreted state law restrictions on minor abortion rights. See Neil A. Lewis, 
Hearing Starts with Judicial Nominee in Defensive Mode, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 
2002, at A15. Furthermore, since federalism is a new tune to play and the real 
concern is about civil and individual rights, lawmakers may be more concerned 
about "conservative activists" disregarding stare decisis and returning both 
abortion and school prayer to the states. For this very reason, abortion and civil 
rights have been front and center in the confirmation hearings of Bush appellate 
court nominees Michael McConnell and Miguel Estrada. See Charles Lane, 
Nominee for Court Faces Two Battles; WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 2002, at Al. 
Moreover, in the wake of the September 11 tragedy, lawmakers may be especially 
interested in a nominee's views on laws that restrict civil liberties in the name of 
national security. 
92. In particular, by inviting interest group representatives to testify at 
these hearings as well as including interest group representatives in strategy 
sessions, confirmation hearings are an excellent way for lawmakers to solidify the 
support of their base constituents. 
93. See Evans, supra note 50; see also John E. Owens, Gingrich's House Has 
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the message it is sending, Senate Democrats have strong 
incentives to use .the confirmation process to demonstrate that 
their vision of the federal judiciary (a Court that protects civil 
and individual rights) is at odds with the Republican vision. 
Towards this end, Senators Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) and 
Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) are playing a leadership role in 
defining the Democrats' message on issues related to the 
composition of the Court. Through newspaper editorials,94 
television appearances,95 floor statements,96 and especially 
through hearings on Rehnquist Court decision making, 97 
Senators Leahy and Schumer are seeking to establish a two-
pronged message, namely: (1) the Rehnquist Court's federalism 
campaign is "conservative," "activist," and targeting civil rights 
and individual liberties, and (2} Democrats must work hard to 
ensure ideological balance on a Supreme Court run amok. In 
sorting out this message, forty-two of the Senate's fifty 
Democrats attended a retreat in which law professors briefed 
Senators both on the need to prevent President Bush from 
"pack[ing] the courts with staunch conservatives" and on ways 
in which they could attack Rehnquist Court decision making.98 
"What we're trying to do," said Senator Schumer, "is set the 
Something in Common with British Parliament, ROLL CALL, Jan. 29, 1996 (noting 
that Gingrich "and other Republican leaders have·long impressed on their House 
colleagues the need to think in terms of party ... . "). 
94. See Charles E. Schumer, Judging By Ideology, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 
2001, at A19 ("The Supreme Court's recent 5-4 decisions that constrain 
Congressional power are probably the best evidence that the Court is dominated 
by conservatives. . . . Tilting the Court further to the right would push our Court 
sharply away from the core values held by most of our country's citizens."). 
95. See Senator Charles Schumer and Jeff Sessions Discuss Whether 
Personal Ideology Should Matter When Confirming Federal Judiciary Nominees, 
NBC News: Meet the Press Transcripts, July 1, 2001, available at 2001 WL 
24103448; Interview by Brit Hume with Senator Patrick Leahy, Fox News: Fox 
News Sunday (July 29, 2001) (transcript on file with the University of Colorado 
Law Review). 
96. See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. S1671-02, S1672 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2001) 
(statement of Sen. Leahy) ("The reality today in courts such as the U.S. Supreme 
Court and Fourth Circuit that are dominated by ideologically conservative 
Republican appointees is that the dominant flavor of judicial activism is right 
wing."). 
97. See generally, e.g., Should Ideology Matter? Judicial Nominations 2001: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary (June 26, 2001), available at 
http://www .senate .gov/ -judiciary/oldsitelhr06260 1sc.htm. 
98. Neil A. Lewis, Washington Talk: Democrats Readying for Judicial Fight, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2001, at A19. 
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stage and make sure that both the White House and the Senate 
Republicans know [what] we expect."99 
Polarization. Judicial confirmation fights are inevitable 
byproducts of the fact that the Senate is more polarized today 
than at any time since the late nineteenth century. Unlike the 
1960s and 1970s, when liberal (Rockefeller) Republicans and 
conservative (Dixiecrat) Democrats resulted in roughly similar 
ideological positions in both parties, ideology and party sharply 
divide today's Senate.100 A plotting of the ideological positions 
of lawmakers would reveal that all Republican coordinates 
would fall on the right and all Democratic coordinates would 
fall on the left.101 One result of this transformation is the 
demise of old Senate folkways, including the norms of 
institutional respect and civility . toward members of the other 
party.102 With less emphasis placed on working in a bipartisan 
way to get things done, attention instead has shifted to 
blocking what the other side wants.103 In such an atmosphere, 
gridlock over the pace of the confirmation process is to be 
expected-so much so that ever-widening party divisions often 
take priority over a nominee's qualifications.104 Indeed, 
"[q]uantitative studies suggest that ideological polarization in 
the Senate may be more significant than divided government 
itself in obstructing presidential nominations, though the effect 
is magnified when different parties control the Senate and the 
White House."105 As such, the effect of the Jeffords switch is to 
99. Id. (quoting Sen. Charles Schumer). 
100. See David E. Rosenbaum, In With the Ideologues, On With Deadlock, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1996, at 4-5. 
101. See id. And with increasing polarization, of course, the parties are 
more homogeneous. This, of course, helps explain why Democrats and 
Republicans are able to pursue unifying messages that will define their party. 
See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
102. For a useful summary, see Brannon P. Denning, Reforming the New 
Confirmation Process: Replacing "Despise and Resent" with "Advice and Consent," 
53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 15-17 (2001) (discussing, among other works, DONALD R. 
MATIHEWS, U.S. SENATORS AND THEIR WORLD 94--117 (1960)). 
103. For a related argument, see BARBARA SINCLAIR, THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF THE U.S. SENATE, 71-101 (1989) (explaining why Senators no longer embrace 
the "reciprocity norm"). 
104. See generally MICHAEL J . GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS 
PROCESS (2000); G. Calvin MacKenzie, Starting Over: The Presidential 
Appointment Process in 1997 (1998), available at The Century Foundation 
http://www.tcf.orgfl'ask_Forces/Nominations/MacKenzie/ (last visited May 20, 
2002). 
105. Keith E. Whittington, The Confirmation Process We Deserve, POL 'y R., 
June & July 2001, at 76, 82. For one recent quantitative study, see Keith T. Poole 
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bolster already existing Democratic opposition to the 
appointment of political conservatives .. · It is little wonder then 
that Senate Democrats have seized upon the Rehnquist Court's 
increasing willingness to strike down civil rights laws on 
federalism grounds. By suggesting that the Court is now 
engaging in "conservative judicial activism," Senate Democrats 
have found a high sounding principle to back up their demand 
that the President's judicial nominees be less conservative than 
either the President or their Republican counterparts in the 
Senate. 
Power. With Republicans controlling the House and the 
White House, the confirmation process is one of the few places 
where Democrats hold the trump card. In other words, since 
this is their "show," they have real incentives to exercise the 
limited power they have.106 Furthermore, if Democrats did not 
use their confirmation power, especially in light of party 
polarization, they would appear little more than a rubber 
stamp for the Republican agenda. 107 
Saliency of the Courts. Court decisions are consequential 
and, as such, the party who does not control the White House 
always has incentives to limit the power of the President. For 
this very reason, Republicans worked hard to limit President 
Clinton's power to appoint judges.108 Likewise, Senate 
Democrats want to throw as many obstacles as they can in 
front of the Bush White House. That way the "bad guys" will 
get fewer judgeships and, perhaps more important, the 
& Howard Rosenthal, D-Nominate After 10 Years: A Comparative Update to 
Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll-Call Voting, 26 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 5 
(2001), available at http://www.voteview.uh.edu/praps99.pdf ("We find that the 
trend to polarization and unidimensionality that we identified in Congress has 
continued unabated through the 105th Congress."). 
106. Relatedly, Democrats may use their confirmation power to pursue a 
broad range of political objectives. For example, the Senate may hold up a 
confirmation hearing in order to secure the President's signature on a piece of 
legislation or a modification of executive branch policy. During the Clinton years, 
for example, the Senate Republicans held back the confirmation of Lois Schiffer, 
Clinton's choice to head the Justice Department's Environment Division, in order 
to secure a change in Justice Department policy on environmental crimes. See 
Neal Devins, Congressional-Executive Information Access Disputes: A Modest 
Proposal-Do Nothing, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 124 (1996). 
107. By analogy, Charles Black has written that the Supreme Court must, 
on occasion, invalidate a law in order to retain its status as an independent 
branch of government. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 87-
88 (1960). 
108. See infra notes 112, 120-121 and accompanying text. 
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President may be forced to moderate his appointments so that 
President Bush will not appoint committed conservatives to the 
bench, especially to the Supreme Court and to appellate court 
judgeships that may later set the stage for a Supreme Court 
appointment. 109 Along these lines, Senate Democrat attacks 
against "conservative judicial activism" tell the Bush White 
House that the cost of appointing conservative judicial 
nominees is quite high. 
Much of the above analysis, of course, calls attention to 
ways in which lawmakers see court decisions as politically 
salient. At the risk of redundancy, three recent examples 
illustrating the saliency of the courts to both Democrats and 
Republicans. First, over the objections of Senators Leahy and 
Schumer, the Bush White House limited the American Bar 
Association's role in judicial appointments by refusing to give 
the ABA a chance to rate nominees before their names were 
sent to the Senate.110 This action fortified a Republican-led 
campaign to limit the ABA, whose evaluations had been 
attacked by conservatives for their "liberal bias."111 In 
particular, when chairing the Judiciary Committee, Orrin 
Hatch refused to include ABA assessments as an official part of 
committee deliberations.112 After the Jeffords switch, Senate 
Democrats reversed Hatch's decision. 113 Second, before the 
Jeffords switch, Senate Republicans limited the power of 
Senators to "blue slip" Bush nominees from their home state.114 
Rather than require the support of both home state senators 
before taking action on a nominee, Hatch sought to limit the 
109. For this very reason, Democrats have targeted, among others, Jeffrey 
Sutton (appointed to the Sixth Circuit) and Miguel Estrada (appointed to the D.C. 
Circuit). See also infra note 123 (discussing Senate Judiciary Committee rejection 
of Charles Pickering). 
110. See Amy Goldstein, Bush Curtails ABA Role in Selecting U.S. Judges, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 2001, at Al. 
111. See Elisabeth Frater, Revenge of the Bork Conservatives, 33 NAT'L J . 
970 (2001). 
112. See Goldstein, supra note 110. 
113. Judicial Nominations: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy), available at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/member_statement.cfm?id=181&wit_id=50. 
114. The "blue slip" is a procedure in which the chair of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee asks the Senators of the nominee's home state whether they support 
the nominee. For a history of the "blue slip," see Brannon P. Denning, The "Blue 
Slip": Enforcing the Norms of the Judicial Confirmation Process, 10 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 75 (2001). 
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"blue slip" to nominees opposed by both home state Senators.115 
In protest, Senate Democrats delayed the confirmation of now-
Solicitor General Ted Olson by walking out of a Judiciary 
Committee meeting. 116 After the Jeffords switch, of course, 
Senate Democrats returned to the preexisting practice.117 
Third, in· .an effort to pressure Senate Democrats to move 
quickly on Bush judicial nominees, Republicans delayed the 
vote on the foreign operations appropriations bill for 2002 (a 
highly visible bill tied to the war on terrorism).118 
Pay Back. With comity among Senators taking a back seat 
to the ever-increasing polarization of Democrats and 
Republicans and the desire of each party to send a message 
distinguishing itself from the other, 119 it is little wonder that 
each party can file a bill of grievances against the other. 
Senate Democrats have a strong desire to pay the Republicans 
back for their management of the confirmation process during 
the Clinton years. At that time, Democrats complained loudly 
about Republican refusals to confirm nominees, Republican 
delays in confirming nominees, Republican success in logrolling 
Republican-preferred candidates in exchange for their 
confirming Clinton nominees, and by Republican claims that 
there were too many judges (so that the seat should have been 
lost, not replaced by a Clinton appointee).120 And if that were 
115. See id. at 83-84. 
116. See Glen Johnson, Democrats' Walkout Signals Partisan Rupture Ouer 
Judges, BOSTON GLOBE, May 4, 2001, at A6. 
117. See Helen Dewar, Senate Reorganization Finalized, Democrats Pledge 
to Follow Tradition on Court Nominees, WASH. POST, June 30, 2001, at All; Dave 
Boyer, Senate Concurs on Reorganization, GOP Fails to Win Pledge on Judges, 
WASH. TIMES, June 30, 2001, at A4. 
118. See Neil A. Lewis, Democrats Are Pushed on Judicial Nominees, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 21, 2001, at A22; AI Kamen, Pressing the Issue of Judicial 
Confirmations, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2001, at A21 (noting Republican effort to 
craft the following message: "You can't get wire taps, search warrants, etc. 
without judges; confirm the President's slate so that efforts to capture terrorists 
won't be delayed."). 
119. See supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text (message politics); supra 
notes 92-96 and accompanying text (polarization). 
120. On the refusal to confirm, see Gerhardt, supra note 104, at 140-143; 
John Podesta & Beth Nolan, Federal Judgeships on Ice, WASH. POST, July 11, 
2001, at A19. On delays in confirming, see John H. Cushman, Jr., Senate Imperils 
Judicial System, Rehnquist Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1998, at AI (noting 
Rehnquist's depiction of the Senate's failure to confirm judicial nominees as 
threatening to "erod[e] the quality of justice"). On logrolling, see Gerhardt, supra 
note 104, at 140-41 (describing how Republicans held judgeships hostage in an 
effort both to force Clinton to nominate Ted Stewart, a nominee embraced by 
Orrin Hatch, and to pressure Betty Fletcher, a sitting Ninth Circuit judge and 
1334 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73 
not enough, Democrats were enraged by Republican efforts to 
capitalize on George W. Bush's White House victory, including 
the limiting of both the ABA's role and "blue slip" holds, 
enraged Democrats.l21 
That Democrats would respond in kind is hardly a 
surprise.122 And charges of "conservative judicial activism" 
facilitate these efforts.123 In particular, these charges create an 
occasion for Democrats: (1) to delay the scheduling of 
confirmation hearings, so that they can first explore the 
Senate's role in curbing Rehnquist Court "activism"; (2) to be 
more scrutinizing when they do hold hearings, so as to make 
sure nominees do not exacerbate these activist tendencies; and 
(3) to refuse to act on "activist" Bush nominees. Making the 
invocation of conservative judicial activism even more 
appealing, Senate Democrats can throw a label at Republicans 
mother of Clinton nominee William Fletcher, to resign on nepotism grounds). On 
Republican claims that there were too many judges, see Gerhardt, supra note 104, 
at 187 (discussing Jesse Helms's objection to James Beatty, a Clinton nominee to 
the Fourth Circuit). 
121. See supra notes 110-115 and accompanying text. 
122. For example, the Bush White House cut a deal with California's two 
Democratic senators, Barbara Boxer and Diane Feinstein, over judicial 
nominations in that state. Under the deal, a bipartisan advisory committee 
(composed of Republican and Democratic appointees) will forward the names of 
possible nominees to the White House. See Henry Weinstein, Process of Judge 
Selection Set Up, L.A. TIMES, May 30, 2001, at 2-1. More striking, only 28 of the 
80 judges nominated by President Bush in 2001 were confirmed by the Senate in 
2001 (with no hearings scheduled for most of Bush's picks to the federal courts of 
appeal). See David G. Savage, Bush's Judicial Nominees Go 28 for 80 in the 
Senate, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2001, at A12. During this same period, successful 
Bush nominees took (on average) 112 days from nomination to confirmation. 
Lloyd Cutler & Mickey Edwards, End the Judicial Blame Game, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 13, 2002, at A29. The average in the first year of Clinton's first term was 
fifty-two days; the average in the first year of his second term was 133 days. Id. 
123. Consider, for example, the Senate Judiciary Committee's Mar. 14, 2002 
rejection of Bush appellate court nominee Charles Pickering. Senator Charles 
Schumer, in explaining his opposition to Pickering, embraced the "conservative 
judicial activism" mantra. Speaking of the need to maintain "balance on federal 
courts" and of his fear that Bush wanted to "stack the courts with Scalias and 
Thomases," Schumer found Pickering unacceptable. Neil A. Lewis, Panel Rejects 
Bush Nominee for Judgeship, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2002, at Al. Other Senate 
Democrats made clear that their Pickering vote, in part, was pay-back for 
Republican resistance to Clinton judicial appointees. Senators Russell Feingold 
CD-Wisc.) and Richard Durbin (D-Ill.) noted that Clinton's failure to get the 
Republican Senate Judiciary Committee to confirm nominees to the Fifth Circuit 
contributed to their decision to reject Bush's nomination of Pickering to the Fifth 
Circuit. See 148 CONG. REC. S1915, S1918 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2002) (remarks of 
Sen. Durbin); David G. Savage, Senate Panel Rejects Bush's Judge Nominee, L.A. 
TIMES, March 15, 2002, at A12 (quoting Sen. Feingold). 
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that Republicans have long used to bolster their efforts to 
reshape the judiciary. 
Democrats also want to pay Republicans back for Bush v. 
Gore, a decision that many (especially academics) condemned 
as unprincipled judicial activism.124 Bush v. Gore, however, 
cannot be the focal point of confirmation hearings. It is too 
much about Democrats versus Republicans and there is too 
great a risk that a fight over Bush v. Gore will not help 
Democrats build public support for their campaign to limit the 
Bush White House. Moreover, notwithstanding its 
significance, it is just one case and a highly unusual, fact-
specific one at that. Rehnquist Court federalism decisions, in 
contrast, can be pitched at a higher level of generality: It is not 
simply about pure politics, but about civil and individual rights 
versus decentralization in government.125 
CONCLUSION 
Senate Democrats have good reason to target the 
Rehnquist Court's federalism revival. With George W. Bush in 
the White House, Democrats have strong incentives to limit 
Bush administration efforts to select judges whose ideology is 
in step with the Republican party. And since Rehnquist Court 
federalism decisions can be packaged as both activist and a 
threat to civil and individual rights, Senate Democrats are 
using the confirmation process to attack "conservative judicial 
activism." In contrast, Senate Democrats have little reason to 
attack the individual decisions of the Rehnquist Court. Unlike 
Court-curbing periods, these decisions do not pit Democrats 
against Republicans. The bills that the Court invalidated 
cannot be characterized as Democratic measures and, as such, 
Democratic complaints against the Rehnquist Court cannot be 
tied to changing alignments of power in the now Democratic 
Senate. More significantly, when responding to the Court's 
124. Five hundred eighty-five law professors, for example, signed onto a 
January 13, 2001 New York Times advertisement, declaring that the justices in 
the Bush v. Gore majority were "acting as political proponents for candidate Bush, 
not as judges." See also Bruce Ackerman, The Court Packs Itself, THE AMERICAN 
PROSPECT, Feb. 12, 2001, at 48 (arguing that the decision casts the Court's 
fundamental legitimacy into question, so much so that the Senate should refuse to 
confirm any Bush appointee to the Supreme Court). 
125. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text (discussing how 
federalism cases can be packaged). 
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federalism-based decisions, Congress has little incentive to 
attack the Court. At least until now, these decisions have been 
quite minimalist-rarely invali.dating all of the federal iaw and 
never denying Congress or the states an opportunity to return 
to the issue. Consequently, rather than target the Court, 
Congress's incentives cut in favor of doing nothing or 
responding to the ruling through new legislation. And while 
the Rehnquist Court could extend its rulings in ways that limit 
core legislative powers, the current round of compl~ints against 
the Court has little to do with the Court's federalism decisions. 
The fight over "conservative judicial activism" does not 
stem from Democratic disappointment with the individual 
decisions of the Rehnquist Court. 126 Instead, it is tied to the 
increasing polarization within Congress, the related desire of 
Senate Democrats both . to exercise power and pay the 
Republicans back for their treatment of Clinton-era nominees, 
the rise of message politics, and the saliency of the courts. 
Having strong incentives to use the confirmation power as a 
way of limiting presidential power, Senate Democrats needed a 
label that would hold their party together and appeal to their 
constituent base. "Conservative judicial activism" is that label. 
126. This is not to say that Democrats approve of these decisions. Instead, 
for reasons already specified, Democrats have little reason to attack the Court for 
any ofthese decisions. 
